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Abstract: Since the beginning of the 21st century with intensified competition in international trade 
and sluggish development of the economy, a gradual rise of trade protectionism has followed. China, 
determined to promote free trade, has proposed trade connectivity with the so-called Belt and Road (BRI) 
countries in the “The Belt and Road” initiative. To study the different effects of free trade on China and 
the BRI countries, this paper uses the newest GTAP 9.0 model and conducts six simulations of different 
approaches to trade liberalization including reducing tech barriers (unilateral and bilateral), reducing tariff 
(unilateral and bilateral), and reducing both tech barriers and tariffs (unilateral and bilateral). It turned 
out reciprocal negotiations to reduce trade barriers would maximize the benefits pertaining to economic 
aspects and trade for both sides. The positive effects of reducing non-tariff barriers were larger than when 
using tariff restrictions. Moreover, this study found that countries located near China, including Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, would reap more benefits. Economic indicators such as GDP growth, 
social welfare in the non-BRI countries especially Asian countries would suffer most in case of lower trade 
barriers between China and the BRI countries. The second-largest negative impact is to European countries. 
Briefly cutting barriers to trade would promote the growth of economic development and trade volume.
Key words: Belt and Road Initiative; GTAP 9.0; non-tariff barriers; tariff; trade liberalization; effects.
1. Introduction
After the financial crisis in 2008, the global 
economy entered a new adjustment cycle. The 
weak growth of the world economy and the 
increased competition in international trade 
has led to a rapid rise of trade protectionism. 
Trade protectionism has increased in 
developed countries and non-tariff barriers 
have increasingly been usedin order to protect 
a country’s own industries and certain special 
groups. , For example, the United States 
officially launched the “301 Investigation” 
on China in August 2017. The basis of the 
investigation was the Article 301 of the 1974 
United States Trade Act, which is seldom used. 
This investigation launched by the United 
States is clearly a manifestation of trade 
protectionism. Because of the existence of 
market failures, trade protectionism supporters 
believe that appropriate interventions can lead 
to a better economic performance.
The main manifestations of trade 
protectionism are trade barriers, including 
tariff and non-tariff barriers. The use of tariffs is 
the most effective policy when foreign markets 
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are distorted. But when the domestic market 
fails, the optimal policy is not related to the 
international trade policy but the domestic one. 
With the opening up of markets, cooperation 
in international trade has deepened. The tariffs 
in many countries have dropped significantly 
since the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Thus, non-tariff barriers are widely adopted 
nowadays due to their inherent hiddenness, 
leading to their not easily being detected 
and retaliated. The widely used Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) is an example of this 
approach. In many developed countries, TBT 
has replaced tariffs as the main means of trade 
protection. According to a WTO report released 
in 2016, the proportion of technical measures, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures is as high 
as 83,3 % of the global non-tariff measures. 
The question is whether or not these non-tariff 
barriers actually protect domestic industries 
and promote economic development.
While China, determined to promote free 
trade, has proposed trade connectivity with 
the so-called Belt and Road countries in the 
“The Belt and Road”. According to the Tariff 
Implementation Plan for 2015 released by 
the Tariff Commission of the State Council, 
the Chinese average tariff level is still 9,8 %. 
The average tariff of WTO member countries 
is about 6 % and the number in developed 
countries is generally about 3 %. In contrast, 
the overall level of tariffs in China is still high 
compared to that of other countries. Because of 
this, residents consume by using procurement 
services or engaging in overseas purchases, 
leading to domestic market losses related these 
aspects of consumer demand. In addition, 
this also results in the loss of import trade 
volume. Therefore, these are arguments for 
the reduction of Chinese tariffs. In particular, 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been 
proposed in order to make tariff reduction more 
likely, and thereby promote and strengthen 
trading activities with other countries. An 
important question is what the impact is of 
reducing the average rate of tariff on the trade 
and economy in the BRI countries.
One of the purposes of the Belt and 
Road International Cooperation Summit 
held in China in 2017 is to focus on a 
smooth, efficient, win-win development, and 
deepening of the Belt and Road economic and 
trade cooperation. During this summit, China 
once again emphasized the liberalization and 
facilitation of trade and investment and the 
importance of resisting trade protectionism. 
Such trade liberalization would improve 
the quality of products and services through 
market competition, improve management 
approaches and reduce the cost of production. 
This would also promote the development 
of related industries in the country by 
the introduction of advanced production 
technologies and management methods. In 
addition, the departments with comparative 
advantages in their own country should 
realize specialization, increase the efficiency 
of the production, realize scale economies on 
a global scale and enhance the international 
competitiveness of their products. 
With free trade theory as its cornerstone 
and inspired by the current world 
development, almost all countries are stepping 
up their cooperation and promoting economic 
globalization so as to raise the social welfare 
in the world. The proposals inherent in the 
Belt and Road Initiative promote the practical 
act of practicing economic globalization, 
strengthening regional cooperation, promoting 
mutual development strategies with other 
countries, complementing each other’s’ 
advantages and promoting the liberalization of 
trade and investment. With the Belt and Road 
Initiative, the extent of the economic effect of 
reducing trade barriers between China and the 
BRI countries deserves to be studied.
The Belt and Road summit proposed 
to promote the development of trade 
liberalization, especially proposed to share 
growth, development and connectivity with the 
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European Union. The European and Chinese 
perspective on China’s BRI differs, however. 
Some Western European countries are worried 
about the impact of the BRI strategy on their 
economy and trade in that that there may be 
some potential negative side effects such 
as increasing organized crime rates, illegal 
transactions and fake products. The negative 
concerns of German scholars pertaining to 
the BRI strategy are mainly manifested as 
economic factors. It has been indicated that 
combined with the policy of “Made in China 
2025” will make China’s industrial technology 
able to catch up with developed industrial 
countries and thus become a strong competitor 
to German enterprises. They propose that the 
BRI strategy will speed up the development 
of China’s industry and lower the costs of 
transportation. This will make it easier for China 
to enter the international market, ultimately 
reducing the competitiveness of German 
industrial goods and their exports. Therefore, 
this paper focuses on whether the promotion 
of trade liberalization and facilitation can 
bring about the growth of regional and world 
economies and trade under the BRI. In addition, 
this paper empirically analyzes the impact 
of reducing trade barriers on the economy 
and trade under different free trade modes 
between China and the BRI countries. It also 
includes a discussion of a feasibility reference 
analysis on the vision of deepening the trade 
cooperation and establishing a regional trade 
agreement between China and the Belt and 
Road countries.
2. Literature Review and Analysis
In the mid-2000s, trade protectionism 
prevailed and many developing countries 
adopted alternative import strategies as their 
foreign trade policy in order to protect their 
markets and industries. In addition, a great 
variety of trade protection or interventionist 
theories and policies were favored by 
developing countries, largely because these 
rely heavily on trade tax revenue as their 
main source of revenue. For example, the 
development of East Asian countries was 
largely attributed to government-promoted 
exports and restrictive import policies [1, 2]. 
There was not much benefit gained from these 
policies; on the contrary, there were often 
losses of open trade and capital markets [3, 4]. 
During this period, however, some 
developing countries in for example Latin 
America tried to adopt trade liberalization 
policies. These failed largely because of 
domestic policies and regulations. Developed 
countries realized trade liberalization earlier 
by opening up markets. Early in the twenty-
first century there was intensified international 
competition and weak developments in 
the economy, leading to increased trade 
protection in developed countries. The main 
theoretical basis for this is the endogenous 
protection theory. This theory proposes that 
trade protection is influenced by endogenous 
variables. In order to increase a competitive 
advantage in the domestic product market, 
domestic private interest groups will step up 
their lobbying activities in support of trade 
protection to make the government adopt a 
highly protected trade policy [5]. 
In addition to the protection of their own 
industries, trade protection policies may also 
be implemented by policymakers to please and 
support special interest groups. Hillman (1982) 
explored this from the view of political support 
in that policymakers will consider the level 
of industrial protection based on maximizing 
support from special interest groups to 
determine the extent to which trade barriers 
are set [5]. Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
expanded on this and established a rigorous 
theoretical model to study the different levels 
of support for protectionism from various 
interest groups. Theoretical analysis shows that 
in a perfectly competitive market, the extent of 
trade protection depends on two factors: the 
elasticity of import demand and the ratio of 
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imports to domestic output. The former shows 
the distortions of social welfare caused by 
trade barriers and the latter shows the impact of 
policies on domestic industries [6]. Marvel and 
Ray (1983) analyzed the determinants of U.S. 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers and found that 
the healthier developing industries receive less 
protection, while the ones affected by policy 
and exporters receive more protection [7]. This 
supports Peltzman-Becker’s regulatory theory 
which proposes that trade protection policies 
are not designed for the common good, but for 
the benefit of special interest groups. Gawande 
(1995) found that non-tariff barriers are 
widely used in the United States as a way of 
retaliation against foreign protection policies. 
In developed countries, as a means of trade 
protection, trade barriers have a limited role to 
play in protecting domestic industries and are 
used more to realize benefits [8].
The original intention of trade barriers was 
to protect domestic industries and promote 
economic development. Unlike developed 
countries, China’s trade barriers are mainly 
set to protect the country’s own markets 
rather than to favor special interest groups. 
Unlike developing countries, China’s fiscal 
revenue relies mainly on domestic taxes. The 
trade tax revenue accounts for a relatively 
small proportion of the overall revenue. 
Therefore, China’s active promotion of trade 
liberalization is expected to be conducive to 
the development of the country’s economy 
and trade. In theory, trade liberalization is 
believed to improve the economic efficiency 
and international competitiveness of a country 
and promote the scale of trade, especially in 
some imperfectly competitive markets [9–13]. 
In recent years, with the increase of data 
availability, many scholars have conducted 
empirical research on the economic effects 
of trade liberalization, including simulation 
analysis of the trade liberalization arrangements 
in different countries or regions. For example, 
APEC trade liberalization results in increased 
capital stock and real GDP growth among 
member countries [14]. Indonesia increased 
GDP, output and social welfare through 
trade liberalization [15], and trade conditions 
improved after trade liberalization spread to 
East Asia [16–17]. Empirical studies on trade 
liberalization between China and other regions 
by Chinese scholars include the analysis of the 
“10+3” economic arrangements in East Asia, 
the FTAs in China and Australia (EU-Korea 
FTA , the United States-Europe FTA etc., hold 
that trade liberalization can increase trade 
among participating countries and develop 
their economy.
With the deepening of trade cooperation 
among various countries and the strengthening 
of cooperation, trade liberalization has 
become an irreversible trend. China’s 
decition to promote trade liberalization was 
demonstrated by the Belt and Road Initiative 
in 2013. Chinese scholars put forward 
countermeasures on the BRI implications, as 
well as the background, strategic planning, 
economic effects, significance and challenges. 
Scholars have, however, rarely analyzed the 
economic effects brought by the reduction of 
trade barriers under the BRI strategy in BRI 
countries . Most foreign experts and scholars 
who have qualitatively analyzed BRI’s impact 
on domestic trade investment and the economy 
have found positive, negative and mixed 
effects. 
The Danish government, experts and 
scholars found the impact of BRI on the 
country’s economy and trade to be positive, 
giving many opportunities for investment 
and development. Similar effects were found 
in studies on Greece, Hungary Slovakia, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. Although 
some Italian studies have indicated negative 
environmental impacts, most findings 
show positive effects. Although the Czech 
government supports China’s BRI strategy, 
some scholars believe that this will not bring 
much improvement and help to the country’s 
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own exports and investments, which is similar 
to views expressed in Germany. Experts and 
scholars from France and the Netherlands 
hold a mixed view, however, pointing to both 
positive and negative effects. Scholars in 
different countries have various views, often 
based on their own national conditions [18].
To conclude, foreign trade barriers have 
mainly been studied focusing on the intrinsic 
causes and mechanisms of their existence. 
Trade protection has shifted from the 
traditional protection of infant industries to 
a system that gathers financial revenue and 
please the special interest groups and fulfill 
other purposes. Due to the differences in scale, 
the level of development and the national 
conditions in different countries, research on 
trade barriers in China are mainly focused on 
their purpose of protecting certain industries. 
Therefore, most studies are focused on the 
impact on domestic industries and the economy 
of the subdivision of different barriers to trade. 
There are relatively few empirical studies 
comprehensively analyzing the different 
free trade situations and the comparison of 
different trade barriers; in particular, there are 
few empirical research articles focusing on the 
BRI countries reducing trade barriers.
Based on the strategic background of the 
Belt and Road initiative, this study focuses 
on its impact on the trade and economy of the 
BRI countries from the perspective of trade 
liberalization. It is assumed that reducing trade 
barriers to promote the development of trade 
liberalization will promote trade activities 
among participating countries, increase trade 
volume and promote economic development. 
Countries that join China’s BRI strategy 
will benefit. Finally, this article proposes 
to establish regional trade cooperation. The 
first part of this paper classifies different 
trade barriers, including tariff- and non-tariff 
barriers. The second part analyzes the role of 
trade barriers as a whole. This paper selects 
the most suitable GTAP model in the field of 
international trade as its analytic framework 
and uses the latest version of the 9th edition 
of the database. Finally, in light of the current 
world situation, this study utilizes China and 
65 countries along the Belt and Road as the 
research objects and analyzes the impact of 
reducing trade barriers between China and the 
BRI countries on the economy and trade in the 
region and with other countries in the world.
3. The GTAP Model, Data Specification 
and Policy Simulation Scheme Design
Given that this paper analyzes the impact 
of international trade barriers, empirical 
analysis is conducted using the GTAP model, 
which is the most widely used in the field 
of international trade. The GTAP database 
contains various economic data on input-
output, taxation, output, investment and 
trade in the same year in many countries. 
Taking into account the impact of changes in 
exogenous variables on different economic 
variables, the GTAP database can provide 
some quantitative results for analysis and 
simulation of policy. The most advantageous 
feature of this empirical analysis is not only 
the use of the latest GTAP 9.0 database, but 
also the distinction of the BRI countries by the 
division of the world’s regions and the further 
breakdown of these countries, so as to study 
the economic and trade impact that a decline in 
trade barriers will have on the BRI countries.
3.1. The GTAP model
The GTAP model is created by the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), which is led 
by professor Thomas W.·Hertelat Purdue 
University and is already widely used in the 
analysis on trade policy. The model portrays 
each country or region as a single economy 
for economic optimization, and then links 
various economies through international trade 
and investment relations to form a general 
equilibrium model of multinational and 
multisectoral entities.
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3.2 Latest database version and group 
description
The earliest GTAP model database was 
released in 1993.After several updates and 
adjustments, the latest version of the GTAP 
model was released in 2015. This is the ninth 
version of the database. GTAP9.0 contains 
more complete data, covers more countries 
and includes richer data; specifically: (1) 140 
regions and 57 departments, (2) bilateral trade 
data of all countries from 1995 to 2013, (3) 
bilateral tariff data from 1995 to 2013, (4) 
improved service trade data for 2004, 2007 and 
2011, (5) improved energy data for 2004, 2007 
and 2011, (6) carbon dioxide emissions data 
from all countries in the world, and (7) labor 
force divided into five types with seven major 
characteristics. Based on the latest version of 
the GTAP database, this paper simulates and 
analyzes the economic and trade impacts on 
reduction of trade barriers between China and 
the BRI countries, focusing specifically on 
aspects related to the reduction of non-tariff 
trade barriers.
Since the GTAP 9.0 database includes 
140 countries and 57 departments, the 
simulation analysis in this article first groups 
these countries or regions, then groups the 
departments and simulates the impact. In 
regard to the groupings of countries or regions, 
this study divides them by geographical 
location, the level of development of each 
country, and the ranking of the import volume 
with China. The specific grouping sare shown 
in Table 1 below.
After the groupings of countries or regions 
are completed, the industries (sectors) are 
further aggregated and regrouped and then 
divided into ten groups according to the 
tradable sectors in China and the characteristics 
of industries, as shown in Table 2 below:
3.3 Policy simulation plans
This paper argues that the realization of 
trade liberalization and facilitation between 
China and the BRI countries would lead to 
positive economic results and promote trade 
development. Based on this, the authors of 
this article conducted serval simulation plans 
to analyze the economic and trade changes of 
all countries after reducing the trade barriers of 
China and the BRI countries. 
Bhagwati（2002） believes there are four 
different forms of free trade worldwide: Two 
are related to unilateralism and the other two 
are related to preferential trade. He proposes 
that both traditional unilateralism and 
reciprocity in multilateral trade negotiations 
play a beneficial role in free trade, while 
aggressive unilateralism and the most-
favored-nation treaty are the cancer in the free 
trade system of the world [19]. The policy 
simulation programs are therefore in this 
paper divided into two groups and subdivided 
according to the different types of trade barriers 
and then grouped into three different cases of 
simulated scheme analysis. Trade barriers are 
classified as tariff and non-tariff barriers. With 
the deepening of BRI, both BRI parties and 
China can provide trade facilitation by further 
reducing non-tariff barriers. At the same time, 
this will further strengthen international trade 
cooperation, promote the smooth flow of 
traditional bilateral trade, promote regional 
cooperation and accelerate the development 
of trade liberalization. Therefore, policy 
simulation plans in this paper also simulate 
the effects of trade liberalization measures, 
primarily tariff reduction aided by non-tariff 
barriers. Specific policy impact programs are 
shown in the following Table 3.
The purpose of simulation plans 1 and 
4 is to study the economic effects after the 
reduction of tariff barriers. This study assumes 
the condition that China and the BRI countries 
would cancel the tariffs after establishing a 
free trade zone. The purpose of simulation 
programs 2 and 5 is to study the impact of the 
decline in non-tariff barriers. The magnitude 
of reduction in non-tariff barriers refers to the 
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Table 1 
Groups of the countries in the GTAP model
China China
BRI countries
41 countries in Asia：
 Malaysia MYS
 Singapore SGP
 Vietnam VNM
 Indonesia IDN
 Philippines PHL
 Thailand THA
4 other countries in ASEAN AU4
 Iran IRN
 India IND
 Other 29 countries in addition to above A29
7 countries in CIS：
 Russia RUS
 Other 6 countries in CIS CIS6
16 countries in Central and Eastern Europe CEE16
Asia
 Japan JPN
 Korea KOR
 Taiwan, China TWN
America
 United States USA
 Canada CAN
 Other countries in America ROA
Europe
 Germany DEU
 Switzerland SWZ
 United Kingdom ENG
 France FRA
 Other countries in Europe ROE
Oceania
 Australia AUS
 Other countries in Oceania ROO
Latin America and 
the Caribbean
 Chile CHL
 Brazil BRA
 Other countries in Latin America ROL
Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa SOA
 North Africa NOA
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Table 2 
Groups of the sectors in the GTAP model
Industrial sector Subdivision industrial sectors included
Agriculture
Rice, wheat, cereals, vegetables, fruits, nuts, oilseeds, sugar crops, 
other crops
Animal husbandry
Forest, cattle and sheep livestock, milk, aquatic products, cattle and 
mutton, animal and vegetable fats
Extractive industries
Coal, oil, gas, minerals and related products, black (ferrous) metals, 
non-ferrous metals and related products
Food industry
Sugar, food products and other related products, beverages and tobacco 
products, animal products and other related products, meat products 
and other products, dairy products, processed rice
Textile industry Plant fiber, wool and silk products, textiles, clothing, leather products
Light industry
Wood processing and chemical products, wood products, paper 
products, motor vehicles and spare parts, transportation equipment and 
other related products
Heavy industry
Electromechanical products and electronic equipment, machinery 
equipment and other related products, metal products, petrochemical 
and coal products, non-ferrous metal products, mineral products and 
other related products, other manufacturing products
Public service Water, electricity, gas manufacturing and retail
Transport industry Transport and other related services, maritime transport, air transport
Other service
Trade, telecommunications, finance and other related services, 
insurance, business services and other related services, entertainment 
and related services, government, court, medical care, education, 
residential services, construction
Table 3
Six types of policy impact program in the GTAP model
Form 
of free 
trade
Traditional unilateralism Reciprocal negotiation
Tariff and 
non-tariff 
barriers 
adjustment 
range
P o l i c y 
i m p a c t 
program
1.China unilaterally abolishes 
import tariffs from the BRI countries
4.Both China and BRI 
countries abolish import 
tariffs from each other
-100%+0
2. China unilaterally reduces non-
tariff barriers on imported products 
from BRI countries
5.Both China and BRI 
countries reduce non-tariff 
barriers on imported products
0+10%
3.China abolishes import tariffs 
and reduces non-tariff barriers on 
products from BRI countries
6.Both sides abolish import 
tariffs and reduce non-tariff 
barriers on imported products
-100+10%
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degree of simulation (i.e., a 10 % decrease, see 
[20]). The purpose of the other two simulation 
programs is to analyze the overall economic 
and trade impact of the two trade barriers 
simultaneously. 
In addition to the magnitude of the 
reduction, the design of the six programs 
covers most of the possible options for reducing 
trade barriers and provides reference for the a 
later establishment of China’s regional trade 
agreements with the BRI countries. This study 
use stms variables from the GTAP database as 
the tariff changes simulations. For the change 
of non-tariff barriers, this paper refers to the 
literature of Hagemejer&Michalek (2010) 
that uses ams variables to measure the impact 
of non-tariff barriers on national economic 
development and impact on trade [21].
4. Empirical Analysis Pertaining to the 
Economic and Trade Effects of Reducing 
the Trade Barriers between China and the 
BRI Countries
Through the use of the latest GTAP9.0 
database, this paper analyzes the impact 
of economic and trade effects on different 
countries and sectors under different forms 
of trade liberalization on the basis of the 
simulation analysis of the impact of the two 
sets of six conditions. 
4.1. The mutual trade barriers between 
China and the BRI countries are generally 
conducive to the economic and trade 
development of both sides and generally 
inhibit the economic and trade activities of 
non-regional countries.
Based on the policy simulation plan, this 
paper analyses the six conditions to reduce 
the impact of trade barriers on the economic 
and trade relations between China and the BRI 
countries.
First, free trade would promote economic 
and trade cooperation between China and most 
of the BRI countries. In particular, it can greatly 
enhance social welfare in China. This result is 
in line with the views proposed by Escolano 
that trade liberalization can bring positive 
effects to the economy. After the liberalization 
of trade, both sides will develop the industries 
with comparative advantages and specialize 
and professionalize their production, thus 
enhance the producing efficiency and scale 
and promote frequent economic exchanges 
and trade activities.
Second, by contrasting the two different 
modes of trade liberalization, it can be 
clearly concluded that trade liberalization 
under reciprocal negotiations has more 
positive economic and trade effects than 
the trade liberalization under the traditional 
unilateralism. For example, the traditional 
unilateral reduction in trade barriers between 
China and the BRI countries contributed to 
an increase in the import value of China and 
Thailand by 7.27% and 7.15%, respectively, 
while they increased by 17.05% and 12.94%, 
respectively, under the reciprocal negotiation. 
The benefits of bilateral trade liberalization 
have multiplied the impact of the advantages 
of reducing trade barriers under traditional 
unilateralism. The most positive impact on 
economic and trade relations among the 
participating countries can be achieved if both 
sides open up foreign markets and realize free 
trade with each other.
Third, in the context of the BRI countries, the 
reduction of trade barriers has greater impact on 
the Asian countries and regions that are closer to 
China, including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia and so on, while this has weaker effects 
on Eastern European countries. This is mainly 
because of the close geographical location of 
East Asian countries and that there is not much 
difference in production and life styles, coupled 
with the relatively low transportation costs. After 
the liberalization of trade between China and 
the BRI countries, the trade costs have dropped 
significantly, accelerating mutually beneficial 
production and trade.
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Fourth, globally unilateral and bilateral 
reduction of trade barriers between China 
and the BRI countries will have a positive 
impact on the economic and trade relations 
among participating countries and adversely 
affect the economic and trade cooperation of 
non-participating countries and regions. This 
mainly results from the trade transfer effect 
that leads to the decline in trade activities with 
other countries, particularly Asian countries 
including Japan and Korea, as well as the 
decrease in social welfare.
Fifth, due to the geographical location, 
the reduction of trade barriers between China 
and the BRI countries has the most negative 
impact on the economic and trade cooperation 
among Asian countries in the non-region 
countries, especially Japan that bears the 
largest loss. The second most negative 
impact is to European countries. The greater 
volume of the country’s trade with China, the 
greater negative impact it would experience, 
and among them, Germany sees the largest 
adverse impact. The negative effect on the 
economy and trade of the United States is 
relatively minor. Then follows the region of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, among 
which Chile and Brazil will experience the 
worst impact. Finally, the effects to Oceania 
and African countries are very small. 
4.2. Comparative analysis of various 
forms of six simulation plans
4.2.1. Reduction on non-tariff barriers 
has greater accelerating impact on the real 
GDP of the BRI countries than canceling 
tariffs.
The effect of reciprocal negotiations will be 
significantly better than the real GDP growth 
brought to the BRI countries on the basis of the 
traditional reduction of trade barriers caused 
by unilateralism. Assuming that China and any 
of the BRI countries abolish the tariffs at the 
same time, then GDP growth in both countries 
would increase. 
In comparison, a decline in non-tariff 
barriers has a greater impact on GDP growth 
on both sides. After reducing the non-tariff 
barriers on products exported to China by the 
BRI countries in Plan 2 by 10 %, the GDP of 
both sides shows a marked increase. Due to 
the geographical proximity of the ASEAN 
countries to China and the high similarity of 
labor-intensive industries, the GDP of Asian 
countries will rise rapidly. In other countries, 
because of the effects of trade transfer, the 
real GDP growth of the country slows down. 
South Korea suffers the most, followed by 
Chinese Taiwan and Japan. If one reduces 
the non-tariff barriers between China and the 
BRI countries at the same time, as a result, 
as shown in the simulation’s Condition 5, 
real GDP growth in the Asian countries, 
especially in the ASEAN countries, will 
double. Real GDP growth of other BRI 
countries will also experience a substantial 
increase. 
In addition, if both sides reduce their tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers, bilateral free trade will 
be greatly increased, leading to the largest 
increase in the real GDP of China. Therefore, 
the unilateral reduction of the tariff rate has 
a negative impact on China’s market activity 
and economic growth, but the unilateral 
reduction of non-tariff barriers leads to the 
opposite effect. Reduction in bilateral trade 
barriers will to a great extent be mutually 
beneficial in promoting both market activities 
and economic growth.
For example, for the 16 Central and 
Eastern European countries, it is only by 
reducing non-tariff barriers under reciprocal 
negotiation that there will be a considerable 
positive impact (up to 0.29%) on these 
countries’ real GDP, with little change in other 
cases. The greatest impacts on the real GDP 
growth are found among Asian countries, of 
which the top three countries with the largest 
increase in real GDP are Thailand, Malaysia 
and Vietnam.
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Table 4
Real GDP change rates in various countries and regions, %
　
Traditional unilateralism Reciprocal negotiation
Change in 
real GDP Scheme1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Scheme 5
Scheme 
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
China 0.03 1.18 1.24 0 1.21 1.22
BRI 
countries
41 countries 
in Asia：
MYS 0.08 0.14 0.24 0.01 1.37 1.37
SGP 0.01 0.02 0.04 0 1.65 1.61
VNM 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.24 2.34 2.82
IDN 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.55 0.59
PHL 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.98 0.99
THA 0.19 0.23 0.47 0.14 0.99 1.21
AU4 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.15 1.24 1.08
IRN 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.35 0.37
IND 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.16 0.12
A29 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.5 0.51
CIS7
RUS 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.15 0.18
CIS6 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.42 0.44
CEE16 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.2 0.29
Asia
JPN 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
KOR -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08
TWN -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
America
USA 0 0 0 0 0 -0.01
CAN 0 0 0 0 0 -0.01
ROA 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0 0
Europe
DEU -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
SWZ 0 0 0 0 0 -0.01
ENG -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
FRA -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
ROE -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
Oceania
AUS 0 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
ROO 0 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Latin 
America& 
Caribbean 
regions
CHL 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
BRA 0 0 0 -0.01 0 -0.01
ROL 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
Africa
SOA 0 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06
NOA 0 0 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
End of table  4
Information resource：RunGTAP simulation result
Among other countries of the world, the 
adverse impact on Europe is relatively large, 
especially in countries that have frequent 
trade with China, such as Germany, but 
have no effect on Switzerland’s real GDP. 
It shows negative impact on Poland’s real 
Fig.1. Real GDP change rates in various countries and regions (Scheme 2)
For example, for the 16 Central and Eastern European countries, it is only by 
reducing non-tariff barriers under reciprocal negotiation that there will be a 
considerable positive impact (up to 0.29%) on these countries’ real GDP, with little 
change in other cases. The greatest impacts on the real GDP growth are found among 
Asian countries, of which the top three countries with the largest increase in real GDP 
are Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam. 
Among other countries of the world, the adverse impact on Europe is relatively 
large, especially in countries that have frequent trade with China, such as Germany, 
but have no effect on Switzerland’s real GDP. It shows negative impact on Poland’s 
re l GDP, although this impact is small. This is inconsistent that BRI policy trade 
facilitation have a positive impaction Polish real GDP. Reducing the trade barriers 
between China and BRI countries has a small impact on real GDP growth of 
countries on other continents. 
 
 
Fig.1. Real GDP change rates in various countries and regions (Scheme 2) 
 
4.2.2. The reduction of trade barriers can benefit international trade 
development and improvement of terms of trade between China and the BRI 
countries 
The trade between China and the BRI countries would be significantly 
improved, increasing the scale of import and export. Lowering the tariffs and tax rate 
in Scheme 1 induces costs reduction and improvements in international trade 
activities. In Scheme 2, reducing non-tariff barriers on what the BRI countries export 
to China increases the import trade of China. At the same time, partly because China 
imports more intermediate goods from these countries, the production costs of China 
will be relatively reduced, thus promoting China's export development. The bilateral 
reduction of non-tariff barriers in Scheme 5 significantly improves China’s import 
GDP, although this impact is small. This is 
inconsistent that BRI policy trade facilitation 
have a positive impaction Polish real GDP. 
Reducing the trade barriers between China and 
BRI countries has a small impact on real GDP 
growth of countries on other continents.
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4.2.2. The reduction of trade 
barriers can benefit international trade 
development and improvement of terms 
of trade between China and the BRI 
countries
The trade between China and the BRI 
countries would be significantly improved, 
increasing the scale of import and export. 
Lowering the tariffs and tax rate in Scheme 
1 induces costs reduction and improvements 
in international trade activities. In Scheme 2, 
reducing non-tariff barriers on what the BRI 
countries export to China increases the import 
trade of China. At the same time, partly 
because China imports more intermediate 
goods from these countries, the production 
costs of China will be relatively reduced, 
thus promoting China’s export development. 
The bilateral reduction of non-tariff barriers 
in Scheme 5 significantly improves China’s 
import and export trade. Japan’s imports 
drops the most, while Taiwan’s exports drops 
the most. 
If one is cutting down bilateral tariffs 
while reducing non-tariff barriers, as 
shown in Scheme 6, the trade effect would 
be enhanced. It can be seen that reducing 
trade barriers can significantly promote the 
expansion of the scale of China’s import 
and export trade; particularly when bilateral 
reductions in trade double the impact on 
international trade. This is consistent with 
Theory of Free International Trade that 
indicate the following: If reducing trade 
barriers and achieving trade liberalization 
and facilitation when both sides are 
specializing in production, as a result of 
economies of scale, the production activities 
would be improved, the exchange of products 
would be strengthened and the trade would 
be improved.
From other non-BRI countries’ or 
regions’ perspectives, their total trade 
volume will, however, be reduced. Among 
them, the trade activities in Asia are the most 
affected. With the unilateral reduction of 
trade barriers in China (Scheme 3), imports 
from Taiwan, South Korea and Japan 
will decrease by 1,97; 1,47 and 1,24 %, 
respectively. Reducing trade barriers under 
reciprocal negotiations has a larger impact 
on the trade activities. Secondly affected are 
the European countries, Latin America and 
the Caribbean regions, of which Germany 
will be the hardest hit among European 
countries who have more trade with China 
(-0,34 % in Scheme 3). Chile and Brazil 
will be hit harder among Latin American 
countries (-0,41 and -0,51 %, respectively, 
in Scheme 3). As for other continents, the 
influence is relatively small, with the United 
States’ imports falling by 0.28% and exports 
increasing by 0,11 % under the impact of 
Scheme 3. The impact on other countries is 
very small.
Under traditional unilateralism, if China 
alone reduces its trade barriers, one will see 
deterioration of the terms of trade in China, 
but the terms of trade of the BRI countries 
will be improved (table 6). Under mutually 
beneficial negotiations, the terms of trade 
in India and Central and Eastern European 
countries will deteriorate, as they will in a 
few ASEAN countries, but the terms of trade 
in most other ASEAN countries will improve. 
Non-BRI countries, except for Canada and 
North Africa, would see an improvement 
of terms of trade. For other countries, the 
situation would become worse. Among 
them, the deterioration in the terms of trade 
in Asian countries is the most serious. For 
instance, under Scheme 3, the terms of trade 
in Japan and South Korea would worsen by 
0.63 and 0.78, respectively. The terms of 
trade in other Asian countries would also 
deteriorate, but these countries would be less 
impacted.
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Table 5
Changes in the scale of import and export trade in countries and regions, %
　
　
Traditional unilateralism Reciprocal negotiation
Scheme1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Scheme5 Scheme 6
IM EX IM EX IM EX IM EX IM EX IM EX
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
China 2.91 2.43 3.32 3.05 7.27 6.44 6.56 4.21 7.52 5.18 17.05 11.4
BRI 
countries
41countries in 
Asia：
MYS 1.15 0.4 2.46 0.77 3.92 1.26 2.53 1.08 2.96 1.19 6.35 2.63
SGP 1.13 0.65 2.45 1.43 3.9 2.22 0.8 0.53 2.73 1.73 3.78 2.4
VNM 0.86 -0.17 0.72 -0.46 1.97 -0.67 10.6 5.84 2.19 -1.46 15.52 6.24
IDN 1.25 0.51 1.52 0.54 3.27 1.26 2.2 1.5 2.4 1.34 5.67 3.57
PHL 0.21 0 1.55 0.14 1.74 0.13 1.36 1.05 1.84 -0.02 3.6 1.46
THA 2.78 -0.47 3.41 -0.63 7.15 -1.27 5.82 0.56 4.57 -1.95 12.94 -1.23
AU4 -0.12 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.23 -0.05 3.5 2.72 1.55 0.75 5.83 4.22
IRN 0.63 0.29 1.14 0.36 2 0.76 3.62 2.62 0.96 0.38 5.7 3.87
IND 0.37 0.35 0.86 0.86 1.41 1.37 2.33 3.24 1.17 1.53 4.85 6.34
A29 1.2 0.47 1.21 0.33 2.77 0.93 1.86 1.09 1.75 0.69 4.35 2.23
CIS countries:
RUS 0.74 0.29 0.8 0.17 1.84 0.57 1.81 0.87 0.79 0.31 3.32 1.55
CIS6 0.12 0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.28 0.73 -0.42 -0.12 0.02 0.95
CEE16 0.04 0.05 0 0.03 0.06 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.14 0.04 0.72 0.77
Asia
JPN -0.42 0.08 -0.75 0 -1.24 0.13 -0.87 0.03 -1.44 -0.13 -2.58 -0.04
KOR -0.5 -0.09 -0.87 -0.23 -1.47 -0.33 -0.74 -0.12 -1.23 -0.33 -2.19 -0.49
TWN -0.65 -0.21 -1.16 -0.46 -1.97 -0.73 -0.69 -0.14 -1.38 -0.52 -2.31 -0.75
America
USA -0.11 0.08 -0.15 -0.02 -0.28 0.11 -0.34 0.04 -0.5 -0.18 -0.95 -0.11
CAN -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 -0.18 -0.1 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.01
ROA -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.11 0.03 0.1 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.19
Europe
DEU -0.12 0 -0.19 -0.04 -0.34 -0.03 -0.25 0.02 -0.4 -0.07 -0.74 -0.05
SWZ -0.06 0 -0.12 -0.03 -0.19 -0.02 -0.15 -0.01 -0.33 -0.1 -0.55 -0.11
ENG -0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.14 0 -0.15 0.04 -0.25 -0.07 -0.46 -0.01
FRA -0.07 0.03 -0.11 0 -0.21 0.04 -0.19 0.04 -0.26 -0.03 -0.51 0.03
ROE -0.08 -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.22 -0.05 -0.18 -0.01 -0.28 -0.09 -0.52 -0.1
Oceania
AUS -0.04 -0.01 -0.3 -0.16 -0.33 -0.16 -0.42 -0.1 -0.75 -0.3 -1.31 -0.42
ROO -0.07 -0.02 -0.11 -0.05 -0.19 -0.07 -0.21 -0.03 -0.17 -0.07 -0.42 -0.09
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Latin 
America& 
Caribbean 
regions
 CHL -0.14 -0.09 -0.25 -0.12 -0.41 -0.23 -0.13 -0.06 -0.28 -0.1 -0.45 -0.17
 BRA -0.12 0.06 -0.37 -0.21 -0.51 -0.13 -0.16 0.13 -0.42 -0.2 -0.63 -0.01
 ROL -0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.14 0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.32 -0.01
Africa
 SOA -0.01 -0.06 -0.23 -0.03 -0.24 -0.11 -0.15 -0.08 -0.44 -0.07 -0.66 -0.16
 NOA -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.15 -0.04 -0.23 -0.08 -0.42 -0.12
End of table 5 
 4
Table 6
Changes in the terms of trade in countries and regions (Unit: %)
Traditional unilateralism Reciprocal negotiation
Terms of trade Scheme1 Scheme2 Scheme3 Scheme 4 Scheme 5 Scheme 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
China -0.44 -0.5 -1.17 1.06 1.07 2.39
BRI countries
41 countries in 
Asia:
MYS 0.51 1.13 1.78 0.32 0.93 1.32
SGP 0.36 0.74 1.23 0.2 0.53 0.83
VNM 0.51 0.76 1.48 -0.55 0.81 -0.03
IDN 0.51 0.71 1.42 0.17 0.38 0.61
PHL 0.16 0.93 1.1 -0.1 0.8 0.54
THA 1 1.22 2.58 0.71 1.33 2.36
AU4 0.01 0.11 0.13 -0.71 -0.31 -1.34
IRN 0.29 0.74 1.15 -0.12 0.64 0.38
IND 0.09 0.23 0.36 -0.61 -0.1 -0.92
A29 0.47 0.61 1.22 0.27 0.44 0.76
CIS countries:
RUS 0.32 0.5 0.94 0.18 0.34 0.56
CIS6 0.06 -0.05 0.04 -0.31 -0.29 -0.7
CEE16 0.02 0 0.03 -0.12 -0.06 -0.25
Asia
JPN -0.21 -0.37 -0.63 -0.39 -0.65 -1.17
KOR -0.28 -0.44 -0.78 -0.44 -0.62 -1.18
TWN -0.36 -0.54 -0.97 -0.47 -0.68 -1.27
America
USA -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 -0.15 -0.21 -0.4
CAN 0.01 0 0.02 0.02 0 0.03
ROA 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Europe
 DEU -0.05 -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.17 -0.32
 SWZ -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.14 -0.22
 ENG -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.1 -0.18
 FRA -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 -0.12 -0.24
 ROE -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.2
Oceania  AUS 0.05 -0.1 -0.02 -0.1 -0.29 -0.42
 ROO 0 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.14
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
regions
 CHL 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.14
 BRA -0.04 -0.11 -0.16 -0.07 -0.13 -0.22
 ROL 0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
Africa  SOA 0.08 -0.13 -0.01 0.04 -0.22 -0.19
 NOA 0.08 0.08 0.2 0.06 -0.01 0.07
End of table 6
Information resource：RunGTAP simulation result.
4.2.3. Reducing non-tariff barriers will 
increase the social welfare in China and 
BRI countries much more than if abolishing 
tariffs.
The positive impact of trade liberalization 
on social welfare under reciprocal negotiation 
is higher than with traditional unilateralism. 
China’s unilateral abolition of tariffs against 
the BRI countries (Scheme 1) will greatly 
reduce the social welfare of BRI countries; 
yet, China’s social welfare will decline 
slightly. If bilateral tariffs are to be abolished 
between China and the BRI countries 
(Scheme 4), China’s social welfare will be 
raised. However, reducing China’s non-tariff 
barriers on import products from the BRI 
countries (Scheme 2), will improve social 
welfare in China the most, about 2.78 times 
more than that of the ASEAN countries. If 
bilateral non-tariff barriers are being reduced 
at the same time (Scheme 5), the increase in 
social welfare in China is about 2,04 times 
that of the ASEAN countries, while the social 
welfare in other BRI countries will grow 
relatively faster. 
In addition, the unilateral reduction of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers in China can increase the 
social welfare of China and the BRI countries, 
although the growth rate in regard to social 
welfare in China is not as large as when only 
reducing non-tariff barriers. But for the BRI 
countries, the reduction of tariffs has a greater 
impact on the welfare than the reduction of 
non-tariff barriers. As the results in Scheme 
6 shows, the bilateral reduction of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers maximize the freedom of 
trade, significantly increasing national social 
welfare on both sides. 
Of all the six schemes, there will be a 
slight decline in global welfare with bilateral 
tariff reductions (Scheme 4), and global social 
welfare can be raised under other scenarios. 
Overall, reducing the barriers to trade between 
China and the Belt and Road countries would 
promote specialized production, allocate and 
use elements more rationally and effectively, 
conserve social resources and improve the 
welfare of both parties. It confirms on the 
improvement of social welfare in member 
states through regional trade cooperation.
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Table 7
Changes of social welfare in countries and regions (Million dollar)
　
Traditional unilateralism Reciprocal negotiation
Social welfare change Scheme1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Scheme 5 Scheme 6
China -2125.28 16877.48 13555.45 6583.14 27148.16 36198.73
BRI countries
41countries in Asia：
MYS 779.5 1697.42 2706.53 593.91 3201.23 3984.03
SGP 601.82 1236.58 2057.65 323.73 2661.89 3110.49
VNM 220.85 289.1 597.73 -37.44 1287.63 1241.99
IDN 483.73 667.77 1337.48 235.08 1731.62 2060.94
PHL 89.65 495.56 587.74 -29.98 1227.77 1124.46
THA 1372.13 1681.64 3523.37 1024.88 3059.6 4573.9
AU4 -0.04 7.23 8.28 -77.51 166.29 60.28
IRN 181.92 413.42 664.59 16.4 846.81 910.59
IND 168.57 337.86 593.88 -1027.11 880.58 -470.97
A29 3122.79 4127.38 8264.97 1899.85 10214.29 12577.78
CIS countries：
RUS 523.68 600.18 1334.43 521.9 1553.2 2257.51
CIS6 12.06 -30.48 -4.97 -233.56 226.82 -117.09
CEE16 40.21 -56.79 15.54 -8.56 984.72 933.34
Asia
JPN -1232.23 -2266.65 -3766.26 -2292.18 -3941.48 -6994.07
KOR -802.51 -1317.82 -2299.13 -1227.76 -1851.57 -3438.35
TWN -725.78 -1116.33 -1992.48 -938.69 -1377.57 -2553.23
America
USA -960.94 -1354.01 -2541.08 -2503 -3835.66 -7080.4
CAN 63.74 -6.22 85.45 89.66 -13.25 101.19
ROA 83.81 65.19 176.75 123.63 46.06 192.61
European
DEU -644.45 -994.21 -1815.4 -1407.85 -2121.68 -4015.76
SWZ -35.8 -80.8 -125.7 -78.46 -199.41 -314.42
ENG -216.32 -302.38 -570.38 -580.39 -972.37 -1751.33
FRA -299.88 -456.8 -848.52 -648.76 -926.33 -1798.14
ROE -794.88 -1430.3 -2439.85 -2139.41 -3429.69 -6241.81
Oceania
AUS 78.7 -129.06 -6.12 -167.4 -422.46 -639.49
ROO 1.94 -11.8 -5.47 -33.46 -29.6 -66.62
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
regions
CHL 8.11 -20.53 -6.63 -4.35 -42.27 -46.74
BRA -35.72 -101.27 -144.39 -63.48 -125.26 -210.25
ROL 57.87 -5.59 81.98 -40.29 -118.5 -165.21
Africa
SOA 153.44 -313.34 -83.16 6.09 -581.61 -615.76
NOA 98.59 93.31 233.18 38.03 -33.31 18.93
Information resource: RunGTAP simulation result.
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Geographically, the reduction of trade 
barriers has a larger positive effect on social 
welfare in countries like Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Singapore, which are close to 
China or are similar to China in their economic 
development. Lowering trade barriers for 
counties farther away from China does not 
result in the same clear-cut improvements 
in social welfare. Overall, the reduction of 
trade barriers between China and the BRI 
countries will result in the improvement of 
social welfare in a majority of countries in the 
region. The social welfare of other countries 
in the non-BRI area is declining. Among 
them, Asian countries such as Japan will see 
the largest drop in social welfare, followed 
by South Korea and Taiwan. The decline in 
social welfare in Europe is relatively larger, 
especially in Germany. Social welfare in the 
United States will decline relatively more, 
while that of other countries will declineless.
4.2.4. Lowering trade barriers would 
stimulate the consumption by governments 
and residents in the BRI countries
China’s unilateral reduction of trade barriers 
helps to stimulate government spending and 
household consumption in the BRI countries. 
Among them, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Vietnam are the most positively stimulated. 
In the case of bilateral reciprocal negotiations, 
domestic consumption in both countries will 
only grow if both China and the BRI countries 
lower their non-tariff barriers (Scheme 5) and 
enhance trade facilitation. If tariffs are canceled 
on both sides, the consumption of residents in 
the Philippines, Thailand and India will decline 
slightly, whereas consumption of governments 
in most countries will fall, while only a small 
increase will be made in government spending 
in Singapore, Thailand and China. For most 
countries in non-BRI regions, consumption 
will decline slightly. Both government 
spending and consumer spending will decline 
in Asian countries. The same thing will happen 
in European countries, but less than in Asia. 
Other countries and regions see less impact on 
both resident and government consumption.
5. Conclusions and Suggestions
This paper uses the latest GTAP 9.0 model 
to analyze the economic and trade effects of 
lower trade barriers between China and the 
BRI countries and compare two methods of 
trade liberalization. By simulating six policy 
plans, the study first concludes that trade 
liberalization under reciprocal negotiations has 
more positive economic and trade effects trade 
liberalization under traditional unilateralism. 
Second, the reduction of non-tariff barriers has 
greater accelerating impact on economic and 
trade of the BRI countries than canceling tariffs. 
Third, in the context of the BRI countries, 
reduction of trade barriers has greater impacts 
on the Asian countries and regions that are 
closer to China, while this has weaker effects 
on Eastern European countries. Fourth, cutting 
trade barriers between China and the BRI 
countries has the most negative impact on 
the economic and trade cooperation among 
Asian countries in the non-BRI countries, 
especially Japan that bears the largest loss. The 
second-largest negative impact is to European 
countries, and among them Germany suffers 
the largest adverse impact.
Briefly cutting barriers to trade would 
promote the growth of economic development 
and trade volume. Also, this would extend 
output and improve social welfare. The 
findings presented in this article support the 
conclusions expressed by Bhagwati [19] about 
the benefits of trade liberalization. If China 
and BRI countries could make agreement on 
reducing mutural trade barriers, the economic 
development and trade cooperation would be 
promote largely, especially for the Asia region 
due to a unique geographical advantage.
The findings of this study suggest that 
China should consider negotiating regional 
trade agreements with the BRI countries in 
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Table 8
Changes in government consumption in countries and regions, %
Traditional unilateralism Reciprocal negotiation
Scheme1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Scheme5 Scheme 6
China -0.32 0.53 0.06 0.03 0.9 0.93
BRI countries
41countries in Asia:
 MYS 0.55 1.22 1.93 -0.12 1.95 1.74
 SGP 0.42 0.86 1.43 0.23 1.78 2.09
VNM 0.41 0.66 1.21 -3.05 2.15 -1.62
 IDN 0.06 0.12 0.2 -0.14 0.28 0.06
 PHL 0.09 0.3 0.4 -0.3 0.76 0.28
 THA 0.83 1.01 2.1 0.11 1.73 1.81
 AU4 0.11 0.18 0.33 -1.29 0.59 -1.09
 IRN 0.02 0.13 0.16 -0.61 0.26 -0.54
 IND 0.03 0.09 0.13 -0.29 0.15 -0.26
 A29 0.12 0.2 0.36 -0.09 0.4 0.24
CIS countries
 RUS 0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.1 0.15 0
 CIS6 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.26 0.24 -0.16
CEE16 0.01 0 0.01 -0.08 0.14 0.02
Asia
 JPN -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09
 KOR -0.06 -0.1 -0.18 -0.09 -0.14 -0.26
 TWN -0.09 -0.13 -0.24 -0.11 -0.16 -0.3
America
 USA 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
 CAN 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0 0.02
 ROA 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0 0.03
Europe
 DEU -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11
 SWZ -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05
 ENG -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06
 FRA -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06
 ROE -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08
Oceania
 AUS 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0 -0.04 -0.04
 ROO 0.01 0 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
Latin America 
& C a r i b b e a n 
regions
 CHL 0.02 0 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0
BRA 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02
 ROL 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0 0.02
Africa  SOA
0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.1 -0.08
 NOA 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.06
Information resource: RunGTAP simulation result.
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Table 9 
Changes of resident consumption in countries and regions, %
Traditional unilateralism Reciprocal negotiation
Scheme1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Scheme5 Scheme 6
China -0.19 0.88 0.59 0.19 1.39 1.65
BRI 
countries
41 countries in Asia:
 MYS 0.52 1.12 1.79 0.6 2.16 2.92
 SGP 0.62 1.28 2.13 0.33 2.75 3.21
 VNM 0.59 0.76 1.6 0.22 3.49 3.77
 IDN 0.19 0.27 0.53 0.08 0.68 0.79
 PHL 0.11 0.65 0.75 -0.03 1.6 1.47
 THA 1.12 1.38 2.89 0.88 2.51 3.81
 AU4 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.49 1.23 0.54
 IRN 0.1 0.24 0.38 0.14 0.51 0.64
 IND 0.02 0.05 0.09 -0.16 0.13 -0.09
 A29 0.24 0.32 0.64 0.18 0.81 1.04
CIS countries:
 RUS 0.1 0.12 0.25 0.19 0.32 0.55
 CIS6 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.22 0.21 -0.09
CEE16 0.01 -0.01 0 0.02 0.2 0.23
Asia
 JPN -0.03 -0.06 -0.1 -0.06 -0.11 -0.2
 KOR -0.14 -0.23 -0.4 -0.22 -0.33 -0.61
 TWN -0.21 -0.33 -0.58 -0.27 -0.4 -0.74
America
 USA -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07
 CAN 0.01 0 0 0.01 -0.01 0
 ROA 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03
Europe
 DEU -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.1 -0.18
 SWZ -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11
 ENG -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.1
 FRA -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.12
 ROE -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.14
Oceania
 AUS 0.01 -0.03 0 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13
 ROO 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
regions 
 CHL 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07
 BRA -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05
 ROL 0.01 0 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
Africa
SOA 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0 -0.13 -0.15
NOA 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.02 -0.02 0
Information resource: RunGTAP simulation result.
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order to dismantle trade barriers and realize 
trade liberalization. When choosing how to 
reduce barriers, non-tariff barriers hould be 
consider first, followed by a reduction in 
tariffs. If the reciprocal negotiations to reduce 
trade barriers develop slowly, China could 
choose unilateral liberalization to extend trade 
and promote the growth of each country’s 
economic development. 
One of the shortcomings of this study 
is that it does not consider the investment 
facilitation between China and the BRI 
countries. This would be an important focus 
of future studies.
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эффекты взаиМных торговых переговоров и реализации
инициативы китая «один пояс – один путь»
Аннотация. С начала XXI века, в условиях обострения конкуренции в международной 
торговле и вялого развития экономики, последовал постепенный рост торгового протекци-
онизма. Китай, преисполненный решимости содействовать свободной торговле, предло-
жил наладить торговые связи с так называемыми странами шелкового пути в рамках ини-
циативы «Один пояс – один путь». Для изучения различных эффектов свободной торговли 
Китая со странами, входящими в программу «Один пояс – один путь», в данной работе 
используется новейшая модель GTAP 9.0 и проводится шесть симуляций различных подхо-
дов к либерализации торговли, а именно снижение технологического барьера (односторон-
ний и двусторонний), снижение тарифов (односторонний и двусторонний) и снижение как 
технологического барьера, так и тарифов (односторонний и двусторонний). Оказалось, что 
взаимные переговоры по снижению торговых барьеров максимизируют выгоды, связанные 
с экономическими аспектами и торговлей для обеих сторон. Положительные последствия 
снижения нетарифных барьеров были более значительными, чем само использование та-
рифных ограничений. Кроме того, это исследование показало, что страны, расположенные 
вблизи Китая, включая Таиланд, Малайзию, Индонезию и Сингапур, могут достигнуть го-
раздо большей выгоды. Экономика, а конкретно рост ВВП и социальное обеспечение, в 
странах, не входящих в программу «Один пояс – один путь», а особенно в азиатских стра-
нах, пострадают больше всего при снижении торговых барьеров между Китаем и страна-
ми, входящими в программу «Один пояс – один путь». Второе по величине отрицательное 
воздействие будет оказано на страны Европейского союза. Кратковременное устранение 
барьеров в торговле способствует росту экономического развития и объема торговли.
	 Ключевые	слова: инициатива «Один пояс – один путь»; GTAP 9.0; нетарифные 
барьеры; тариф; либерализация торговли; эффекты.
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